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9The role of insurance risk transfer in encouraging
climate investment in developing countries
swenja surminski
INTRODUCTION
Environmental change has profound effects on economies, wider society,
individuals and ecosystems. Responding to threats such as pollution, loss of
biodiversity or climatic changes requires public policy intervention, as well
as private action and signiﬁcant new capital investments. Under the caption
of ‘sustainable development’ more and more private companies and
national governments pledge to balance the economic, social and environ-
mental effects of growth. Innovative solutions are being developed and
tested, especially in the context of ﬁnancing the required action. One
particular area that receives increasing attention is how best to foster
public and private investments in environmental protection. This is espe-
cially relevant for low-income countries: often those most exposed to
environmental changes are least capable to respond to the threats, and
require ﬁnancial and technical support from developed countries and
donors. Most commentators have focused on the role of public policy in
facilitating the required environmental investments.1 Conversely, the appli-
cation of ﬁnancial instruments such as insurance is still under-researched.
The author wishes to thank Andrew Williamson and Delioma Oramas-Dorta for their input
and helpful comments.
1 See D. Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation (London: MIT Press, 2006);
E. Somanathan and T. Sterner, ‘Environmental Policy Instruments and Institutions in
Developing Countries’, in R. López and M. Toman (eds.), Economic Development and
Environmental Sustainability: New Policy Option (Oxford University Press, 2006), chap. 7;
F. Foxon and P. Pearson, ‘Overcoming Barriers to Innovation and Diffusion of Cleaner
Technologies: Some Features of a Sustainable Innovation Policy Regime’ (2008) 16 Journal
of Cleaner Production 148; S. Fankhauser, ‘A Practitioner’s Guide to a Low-Carbon
Economy: Lessons from the UK’, Policy paper, Centre for Climate Change Economics
and Policy, 2012, available at www.cccep.ac.uk (accessed 24 January 2012).
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Insurance risk transfer has been used for centuries as a tool to manage
the risk of uncertain losses. In its most basic form insurance is a
mechanism where risks or part of a risk are transferred from one party
(the insured) to another party (the insurer) in return for a payment
(the premium). The insurer pays out a previously agreed amount if the
insured experiences a loss, or if a predeﬁned event occurs.2 In other
words, the insured pays a certain premium to reduce the risk of an
uncertain loss. This reduction in uncertainty is widely seen as an import-
ant mechanism driving our economic systems: without insurance many
activities and processes would be deemed too risky and would not
be undertaken. Moreover, in the event of a loss, those affected might
struggle to recover. In economic terms the justiﬁcation for any insurance
is derived from the welfare function, which means that the provision
of insurance can increase the expected utility of individuals, companies
or society.
At ﬁrst sight insurance seems an unusual choice for supporting
environmental protection: the inherent problem of moral hazard can
mean, in an environmental context, that the provision of an insurance
policy triggers risky and unwanted polluting activities on the side of the
insured. But safeguards can be designed in order to avoid moral hazard
and incentivise risk reduction by the policyholder. An example is
environmental-liability insurance, where the insured is often required
to assess and improve standards and procedures that could lead to
pollution. This creates an incentive for those companies seeking insur-
ance to comply or exceed environmental standards as the policy will only
pay out if the insured is compliant. In addition to this indirect risk-
reduction role derived from the compensation function of insurance,
there is another dimension of the environmental role of risk transfer:
insurance can make investments less risky and therefore foster innov-
ation and the development of cleaner technologies.
Most of the existing analytical work exploring the environmental role
of risk transfer has focused on two risk areas: pollution liability and
natural disaster insurance, which can both have catastrophic conse-
quences. A 2003 OECD study ﬁnds that, with pollution insurance, the
insurer may act as a private surrogate regulator aligning its interests with
2 N. Ranger, S. Surminski and N. Silver, ‘Open Questions about How to Address “Loss and
Damage” from Climate Change in the Most Vulnerable Countries: A Response to the
Cancún Adaptation Framework’, Policy paper, Centre for Climate Change Economics and
Policy, 2011, p. 9, available at www.cccep.ac.uk (accessed 15 March 2012).
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those of high environmental standards.3 The internalisation of environ-
mental costs through the payment of premiums is compatible with the
deterrence goal of any liability regime and with the polluter-pays
principle. Conversely, Minoli and Bell4 ﬁnd in an evaluation of two
leading UK insurance companies’ pollution claims that the insurers’
initial underwriting assessments and post-loss investigations are insufﬁ-
ciently developed. Similarly, the management practices of insured parties
in connection with the prevention of pollution are also underdeveloped.
Consequently, insurers’ terms and conditions on policies are insufﬁcient
to work as an incentive to dissuade pollution losses. The effectiveness of
environmental insurance has been extensively researched for the USA.
Some studies show indeed that despite a range of practical barriers
environmental insurance can achieve efﬁciency where government ﬁnes
do not.5 In the context of natural disaster, the main analytical focus has
been on the potential for insurance risk transfer to be coupled with
incentives (such as building standards and codes) and other regulatory
instruments to reduce potential losses from natural disasters. Surminski6
ﬁnds that there is evidence of insurers engaging in disaster risk reduction
by raising awareness, promoting and supporting the risk-reduction activ-
ities of their clients, but measuring the effectiveness of these efforts
remains a challenge.
While most of the literature has explored pollution liability and nat-
ural disaster insurance in the context of developed markets, there is now
a growing focus on emerging markets and developing countries. Here the
situation is characterised by low insurance penetration and growing risks.
Freeman and Kunreuther7 describe the challenges faced by developing
countries when utilising insurance products for risk management.
3 OECD, Environmental Risks and Insurance: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of
Insurance in the Management of Environment-Related Risks, Policy Issues in Insurance,
No. 6 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003), available at www.oecd-ilibrary.org (accessed 15
January 2012).
4 See D. M. Minoli and J. N. B. Bell, ‘Insurance as an Alternative Environmental Regulator:
Findings from a Retrospective Pollution Claims Survey’ (2003) 12 Business Strategy and
the Environment 107.
5 See H. Yin, A. Pfaff and H. Kunreuther, ‘Can Environmental Insurance Succeed Where
Other Strategies Fail? The Case of Underground Storage Tanks’ (2011) 31 Risk Analysis 12.
6 S. Surminski, ‘Adapting to the Extreme Weather Impacts of Climate Change – How Can
the Insurance Industry Help?’, ClimateWise, November 2010, available at www.climate-
wise.org.uk (accessed 12 March 2012).
7 P. K. Freeman and H. Kunreuther, Managing Environmental Risk Through Insurance
(Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 159–89.
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Pollution insurance or natural catastrophe risk insurance requires a
sophisticated set of laws, regulations and administrative agencies.
A 2012 report by Swiss Re, a large reinsurer, on the evolution of pollution
insurance in China, notes that, while the potential for pollution insurance
remains sizeable in China, several challenges remain.8 These include the
need for a developed legal framework, the current small market base for
pollution insurance, ﬁrms’ lack of in-house knowledge and client aware-
ness and an absence of historical loss data. The existence of an appropri-
ate legal framework seems particularly important. Warner and others9
ﬁnd that community risk awareness, dissemination of risk information
and ﬁnancial literacy are particularly important for disaster insurance
schemes in developing countries.
In this context, the present chapter explores the potential of insurance
instruments to tackle one major environmental challenge, namely cli-
mate change. It is well documented that the greatest threats from climate
change are expected in those parts of the world that are most vulnerable.
Assisting those countries in their efforts to become more resilient to
climate risks is now a key part of the international climate negotiations
under the UNFCCC.10 Agreeing a suitable Adaptation Framework will
require signiﬁcant funds – and there are growing expectations amongst
policymakers that this will be met to a large extent by the private sector.
At the same time it is evident that any signiﬁcant reduction in global
emissions over the next decades will have to involve those countries with
the highest current growth rate. Fostering low-carbon growth in develop-
ing countries is therefore a key goal of global climate policy. Financing
this transition to ‘greener’ economies will require large investments, both
publicly and privately.
Generally speaking, any investment carries risks and opportunities.
Investments will only be made if the rate of return is high enough to
justify the risks involved. In the context of climate mitigation and
adaptation in developing countries the risks are often perceived to be
particularly high (in some cases too high) to encourage private invest-
ment, with projects not meeting the required ‘investment grade’ status
8 Swiss Re, ‘Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in China: A Bumpy Road Leading
to a Bright Prospect’ (2012). Available at www.swissre.com (accessed 11 March 2012).
9 K. Warner, N. Ranger, S. Surminski et al., ‘Adaptation to Climate Change: Linking
Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance’, paper prepared for the United Nations Inter-
national Strategy on Disaster Reduction (Geneva: UNISDR, 2009), available at www.
preventionweb.net (accessed 14 March 2012).
10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 849.
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required by many investors. This chapter explores if and how insurance
risk-transfer schemes could encourage investment in climate-related
projects in developing countries. The analysis focuses on the compen-
sation, risk-reduction and supporting environmental investment func-
tions of insurance schemes.11
After a brief discussion of the potential role of insurance in environ-
mental protection in developing countries (9.1.), the chapter analyses the
particular case of insurance of climate-change-related investment in
developing countries, in the context of both mitigation and adaptation
(9.2.). The chapter concludes with a summary and an outlook on future
perspectives (9.3).
9.1 Financial instruments and environmental protection
in developing countries: the role of insurance
Insurance is a widely used ﬁnancial product in most developed countries,
although availability, demand and scope vary signiﬁcantly from country
to country owing to local customs and traditions, different risk attitudes
and regulation. Insurance can come in different forms and shapes: (i) it
can be provided by public or private entities;12 (ii) the insured might seek
cover on a voluntary basis or it can be compulsory; (iii) it can cover
individuals, businesses, insurers/reinsurers (via reinsurance), organisa-
tions or governments; (iv) it can cover different types of hazards (e.g.,
ﬂood or illness) and exposures (homes, motor cars or business
11 Insurance encompasses two kinds of activities: providing insurance risk transfer (liability
side) and investing insurance funds (asset side). The liability side of insurance can be
classiﬁed into different categories: life insurance, non-life insurance, reinsurance (insur-
ance of insurers) and alternative risk transfers. The asset side of insurance is concerned
with investing the funds accumulated and managing the capital base of an insurer. As
institutional investors, insurers can inﬂuence capital ﬂows across asset classes and
markets. But this chapter only considers the liability side of insurance. Obviously there
is an environmental role to play for insurers as institutional investors, just like for any
other investors. But an assessment of this investment role is beyond the scope of the
chapter.
12 In general terms, insurance can be provided by the private sector or ‘publicly’ through
governments and governmental agencies. Within this spectrum, variation exists and
some large-scale risks, such as terrorism or natural catastrophe, are covered through
public–private partnerships, where the private insurance industry and government share
risks. Private companies can be domestic or foreign, and the cover can be provided
directly or via reinsurers, who mainly operate at a global scale. Insurance companies can
also take the form of mutuals, which are owned by the insured, and function like
cooperatives.
232 swenja surminski
interruption) and have different coverage designs (varying levels of cover,
features such as deductibles, exclusions, conditions); (v) and the cover
provided can be loss-based (a loss must be evident) or parametric
(triggered by a certain event).
The provision of risk transfer is still in its infancy in most develop-
ing countries, as shown by the distribution of insurance premiums. In
2010, Europe (37 per cent) and North America (30 per cent) were the
largest insurance markets in terms of premium volume. Asia
accounted for 27 per cent of the global premium volume. In contrast,
Latin America and Africa/Oceania only made up a 6 per cent share of
the global insurance premiums (3 per cent each).13 Most developing
countries experience very low insurance penetration rates.14 Insurance
penetration shows the relationship between economic growth (GDP
or GDP per capita) and insurance premiums, and it is an indicator of
how active and developed the insurance sector is within a country.15
Plotting penetration levels against per capita income for different
countries produces the so-called Global Trend Line (Munich Re) or
‘S-curve’ (Swiss Re). This relationship suggests an income elasticity
of insurance premiums, which typically varies with the stage of
economic development: with growing income insurance penetration
increases, after a certain level of GDP per capita is reached it tends
to plateau.16
Mainly due to the growth of emerging economies, insurance activities
are now spreading more widely across the globe (Figure 9.1). A range of
studies have underlined the importance of stable and effective institu-
tions for a functioning insurance market, such as law enforcement, but
also the availability of risk data.17 Education and ﬁnancial literacy levels
are also perceived to be driving factors for the development of
13 See CEA, European Insurance – Key Facts (Brussels, 2011), 4, available at www.insur-
anceeurope.eu (accessed 21 January 2012).
14 See H. Ibarra and J. Skees, ‘Innovation in Risk Transfer for Natural Hazards Impacting
Agriculture’ (2007) 7 Environmental Hazards 62.
15 See S. Hussels, D. Ward and R. Zurbruegg, ‘Stimulating the Demand for Insurance’
(2005) 8 Risk Management and Insurance Review 257.
16 Data provided by Munich Re. See also N. Ranger and S. Surminski, ‘A Preliminary
Assessment of the Impact of Climate Change on Non-Life Insurance Demand in the
BRICS Economies’, Working Paper 72, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
(2011), available at www.cccep.ac.uk (accessed 17 January 2012).
17 See L. Brainard, ‘What is the Role of Insurance in Economic Development?’, Zurich
Government and Industry Thought Leadership Series (2008), No. 2; Hussels, Ward and
Zurbruegg, ‘Stimulating the Demand for Insurance’.
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insurance.18 In addition, the speciﬁc characteristics of a market, such as
distribution channels and appetite for innovation in terms of products
and services can drive or hold back the development of insurance.19 The
last decade has seen several efforts to liberalise the insurance industry.
Despite some local differences, there is indeed a trend towards the
opening up of national markets (such as in China and India) to foreign
companies, international trade liberalisation and harmonisation of the
EU insurance market.
The insurance products available in developing countries reﬂect the
scope of coverage available in more established insurance markets,
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Figure 9.1 Relationship between gross national income (GNI) per capita (expressed
in purchasing power parities (PPPs)) and the penetration of non-life insurance
(percentage of GDP) in 2009 for 200 countries
Notes: The grey line is the ‘global trend line’. The vertical lines indicate approximate
phases of market development.
Source: Data provided by Munich Re. N. Ranger and S. Surminski, ‘A Preliminary
Assessment of the Impact of Climate Change on Non-Life Insurance Demand in the
BRICS Economies’, Working Paper 72, Centre for Climate Change Economics and
Policy (2011), 9. Available at www.cccep.ac.uk (accessed 17 January 2012).
18 See P. Masci, L. Tejerina and I. Webb, ‘Insurance Market Development in Latin America
and the Caribbean’, Inter-American Development Bank Sustainable Development
Department Technical Papers Series, IFM-146, 2007.
19 See UNCTAD, Trade and Development Aspects of Insurance Services and Regulatory
Frameworks, 2007, available at www.unctad.org (accessed 11 March 2012).
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including life and non-life (such as health, motor, property, crop,
funeral, commercial) risks. Government schemes are also in oper-
ation, mainly in the social insurance context and for certain catas-
trophe types, backed by global reinsurance and/or international
donors. Speciﬁcally designed for developing countries are micro-
insurance and some new forms of parametric insurance, mainly used
in the agricultural sector. Despite recent growth trends, both private
and public insurance schemes still face a lot of challenges in develop-
ing countries, such as lack of capital by domestic players or govern-
ments due to weak ﬁnance sectors and limited access to global
markets.
The main role of insurance is the transfer of risks and the provision of
compensation in the event of a loss. Well-designed20 insurance initiatives
and markets can play a wider economic and social role by:
1. promoting ﬁnancial stability and security at both the national and
personal levels;
2. encouraging productive investments and innovation through the miti-
gation of the consequences of ﬁnancial misfortune;
3. mobilising savings;
4. contributing to an efﬁcient use of capital based on insurers’ role as
signiﬁcant institutional investors;
5. facilitating ﬁrms’ access to capital (as institutional investors);
6. reducing the capital ﬁrms’ need to operate;
7. promoting sensible risk management through the price mechanism;
and,
8. fostering stable consumption throughout the customer’s life.21
Insurance can also play a social welfare role, taking over some public
relief functions and being used as a tool for public policy, for example, in
the context of social security.
Some of the factors from the list above hint at a potential role for
insurance in environmental protection. Item (1) can be seen in the
context of providing compensation for victims, for example, in the case
of accidental pollution. Item (2) is about reducing the ﬁnancial risk of a
20 By contrast, badly designed insurance products and badly structured insurance markets
can lead to moral hazard, maladaptation to future risks and to inefﬁciency.
21 See Geneva Association, Global Insurance Industry Factsheet (2010), 4, available at www.
genevaassociation.org (accessed 15 February 2011).
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particular activity, for example, for investors in new ‘green’ technolo-
gies. Item (7) touches on incentivising risk management, for example,
by charging higher insurance premiums for those activities that might
harm the environment. Table 9.1 provides an overview of different
types of insurance and links them to the broad functions of insurance
listed above, as well as with their more speciﬁc environmental
applications.22
Table 9.1 Links among types of insurance, function and applications
Type of
insurance Risks covered Environmental applications
Liability Accidental pollution, directors
and ofﬁcers
Compensation of victims,
funding of clean-up, fostering
risk reduction ¼ no. 1 + no. 7
of the insurance functions
Project
insurance
Construction risks delivery
failure, property damage,
political risk, business
interruption
Facilitating ‘environmental’
investment and supporting
technological innovation by
transferring risks ¼ no. 2 of
the insurance functions
Natural
disaster
Property damage, business
interruption
Compensation for damages,
funding of recovery efforts,
fostering risk-reduction ¼ no.
1 + no. 7 of the insurance
functions
Policy risks Change in subsidies Facilitating ‘environmental’
investment and supporting
technological innovation by
transferring risks ¼ no. 2 of
the insurance functions
22 In addition to these four categories there is a much broader range of environmental
applications which are not considered in this analysis. They are often captured by the
heading ‘green products’. These are often adaptations of existing products, such as motor
insurance, which are designed with a link to environmental aspects, such as pay-as-you-
drive motor insurance policies that have been promoted as ‘policies to reduce private
usage of cars’, and policies that achieve greater energy efﬁciency, such as ‘eco homes’
policies. A good overview is provided in E. Mills, From Risk to Opportunity: Insurer
Responses to Climate Change (Boston, Mass.: Ceres, 2009).
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Particularly the risk-reduction element (7) in the above framework is
linked to the issue of moral hazard: pollution insurance and also natural
disaster cover could be seen as a licence to pollute or a licence to build
and operate in a way that is unnecessarily harmful to the environment,
unless a direct link between the environmental efforts of the insured and
the level of the premium is established. Here, insurance, if designed
properly, can offer an incentive for prevention and risk reduction, for
example, by imposing certain operational standards, which reduce pollu-
tion risks.
The application of these insurance instruments has been predomin-
antly focused on developed countries and established insurance
markets. Estimating the market size remains difﬁcult. For natural
catastrophe (or ‘nat cat’) insurance there is evidence of an insurance
gap. Estimates indicate that in developing countries only 3 per cent of
natural disaster losses are insured compared to 40 per cent in
developed markets.23 For pollution insurance anecdotal evidence sug-
gests a global market size of around US$3 billion, which is heavily
dominated by the US market.24 For the size and spread of nat cat
insurance the most commonly used indicator is insured loss, with a
global ﬁgure of US$38 billion stated for 2010,25 again heavily domin-
ated by the US market and other developed countries. Only
recently have there been increased efforts to provide risk transfer in a
low-income country context. Guoqiang and Jinyan26 analyse the
progress of environmental insurance in China. In the municipalities
Dalian, Changchuan, Shenyang and Jilin, pollution insurance was
initially developed in the 1990s as a collaborative effort between the
local environmental protection departments and insurance companies.
The authors state that the initial development of pollution insurance
was unsuccessful and that, in 2007, the State Environmental Protection
23 K. Warner and A. Spiegel, ‘Climate Change and Emerging Markets: The Role of the
Insurance Industry in Climate Risk Management’, in Geneva Association, The Insurance
Industry and Climate Change – Contribution to the Global Debate (Geneva: Geneva
Association, 2009), 83–96.
24 Based on interviews with market players by the author in February 2012.
25 Munich Re NatCat Service, 2011: Natural Catastrophes Worldwide 2010, available at
www.munichre.com (accessed 13 Februrary 2011).
26 R. Guoqiang and S. Jinyan, ‘The Conditions of China’s Environmental Liability Insurance
System: Bioinformatics and Biomedical Engineering (iCBBE)’, paper presented at
the 2010 4th International Conference, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org (accessed
15 February 2011).
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Department provided a framework to establish an environmental
pollution liability insurance system that would serve gradually to
expand pollution insurance coverage nationwide. Despite this road
map, the industry still faces several challenges, including better scoping
of coverage; a more scientiﬁc process for formulating premium prices;
a much improved legal framework, including a clearer understanding
of liabilities and compensation; strengthened government support; and
improved general awareness for companies and households of environ-
mental risk.
9.2 The case of insurance risk-transfer and climate-related
investments in developing countries
9.2.1 Introductory observations
Triggered by a wide scientiﬁc consensus about the seriousness of the
problem, there is growing international agreement on the need to take
action now to avoid future catastrophic climatic changes. But decision-
making on climate change activities is complicated by a prevailing level
of uncertainty about the exact nature of climatic changes and the costs
and beneﬁts of the action required now and in the future. The risks and
uncertainties arise directly from the physical impacts of climatic
changes such as extreme weather events, natural disasters or slow-onset
developments such as sea-level rise, but also indirectly from the
political responses to these challenges. Mitigation targets, climate policies
and promotion of low-carbon technologies are all subject to political
negotiations and their implementation could be adjusted, cancelled or
delayed depending on political decisions. For those who provide
insurance-risk transfer this creates new risks, but also opportunities.
Often triggered by large-scale losses from extreme weather events, some
private insurance companies have explored the issue of climate change by
collaborating with scientists, publicly engaging in policy debates and
also assessing the climate impacts on and opportunities for their own
products.27
27 Individual companies and sector initiatives such as ClimateWise and UNEPFI’s Insur-
ance Working Group, as well as industry organisations such as the Chartered Insurance
Institute, the Geneva Association and national trade bodies have started publicly to
address this issue through statements, research and events.
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As insurance is still in its infancy in the developing world, not much
attention has been given to the role of risk transfer in supporting climate
activities in those countries. But in the wake of international climate
negotiations the issue of climate change in developing countries is now
receiving more attention amongst those who provide insurance. For
example, signatories to the ClimateWise industry initiative have pledged
to ‘consider how we can use our expertise to assist the developing world
to understand and respond to climate change’,28 while other groups such
as the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII)29 work with the UN
on proposals for climate insurance schemes in developing countries. The
discussion about insurance as a tool to foster investment in climate
activities in developing countries can be applied to both the adaptation
and mitigation sides of climate change policies.
Adaptation to climate change is deﬁned by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) as ‘adjustment in natural or human systems in
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which
moderates harm or exploits beneﬁcial opportunities’.30 It captures a range
of efforts to manage the effects of climate change, such as building ﬂood
defences, developing water irrigation systems or educating people about
coping with heat. In the past often regarded as the poor relative of climate
mitigation, adaptation is now an accepted part of climate policy. Even if all
proposed mitigation measures were to be successful and global emissions
levels could be reduced, there would still be a need to adapt to those
climatic changes induced by historic emissions. Adaptation comes in
different forms and includes both soft (e.g., education) and hard measures
(e.g., strengthening of buildings to withstand wind storms). Adaptation is
of great importance to developing countries, which are often highly
vulnerable to climate change. The international community has recog-
nised this challenge. Following the 2010 Cancún climate negotiations,
the UNFCCC is now exploring insurance solutions for most vulnerable
countries as part of a ‘loss and damage’ work plan.31 For insurers, the
28 See ClimateWise – Principle No. 3 – Support Climate Awareness Amongst our Custom-
ers, available at www.climatewise.org.uk (accessed 11 March 2012).
29 See www.climate-insurance.org (accessed 11 March 2012).
30 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Impacts,
Assessment and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment
Report (2007), technical summary.
31 The plan appears in Decision -/CP.16, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UNFCCC/AWGLCA/
2010/L.7, paras 25–9, available at http://unfccc.int (accessed 11 March 2012).
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concept of adaptation shows many similarities to the general principle
of risk management: taking action to increase resilience and to reduce
current and future risks. One could consider insurance itself as a form
of adaptation, as it increases the ﬁnancial resilience of policyholders, for
example, through ﬂood insurance. While some risks arising from cli-
mate change can be reduced through better preparedness, there will
always be residual risks that can leave those exposed with signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial gaps and increase poverty. One could also argue that
adaptation is a way of maintaining the insurability of these risks,
especially in the context of extreme weather events, and that effective
adaptation may actually become a condition for granting insurance
cover in the future, with insurance picking up the residual risks and
extremes. A key question in this context is if and how insurance
products could be designed in such a way that they trigger adaptive
behaviour.
The IPCC deﬁnes climate mitigation as: ‘implementing policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance sinks’.32 In the
discussion about mitigation policies there is a growing focus on
how ﬁnancial instruments can help fostering low-carbon growth in
developing countries through channelling investment ﬂows into
low-carbon technologies. The Copenhagen Accord33 signiﬁed that
deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions were required in
order to hold the increase in global temperatures to below 2
degrees Celsius. This target was subsequently conﬁrmed by the
Cancún Agreements34 and is expected to play a guiding role in
the negotiations triggered by the Durban Platform.35 Achieving
these emissions reductions requires a shift to a low-carbon econ-
omy or, as noted by Nicholas Stern, ‘a new industrial low-carbon
revolution’.36 The World Bank estimates that an amount of
32 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report (2007), technical summary.
33 Decision 2/CP.15, Annex (Copenhagen Accord), FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add. 1, para. 2.
34 Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 15 March
2011, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add. 1, para. 138–40.
35 Draft Decision -/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action, preamble.
36 See ‘Lord Stern: Avoid Dangerous Warming with “Industrial Low-Carbon Revolu-
tion” ’, 21 March 2011, available at www.climateactionprogramme.org (accessed 11
March 2012).
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US$240–600 billion a year is required by developing countries for
building low-carbon infrastructures.37 Due to the magnitude of the
funds needed it is clear that, alongside traditional public develop-
ment funding, private investment will have to provide a large part
of the funds required, mainly in the form of foreign investments in
areas such as renewable energy, reforestation or low-carbon tech-
nology transfer. Therefore a lot of emphasis is currently placed on
creating the right environment and conditions to facilitate private
and public investment ﬂows.38
At a 2010 roundtable discussion hosted by rating agency
Standard & Poor’s and specialist ﬁrm Parhelion, representatives from
the capital markets concluded that climate change-related investments
‘are fraught with risks’.39 Participants listed twenty-eight speciﬁc risks
they face when providing climate change ﬁnance, ranging from tech-
nology risk (‘technology is not efﬁcient and/or too complex and/or
not publically accepted’)40 to human/operational risks (‘lack of well-
trained workforce to implement projects’).41 Against this backdrop
the chapter now explores evidence of insurance risk transfer related to
climate activities in developing countries, based on four risk-transfer
categories: liability; project insurance; natural disaster cover; and
policy risks.
9.2.2 Liability insurance
Environmental-liability or pollution insurance is available in most
developed insurance markets.42 Historically, environmental damage
was usually covered under general-liability policies. In the 1990s, in the
37 K. Neuhoff, S. Fankhauser, E. Guerin et al., ‘Structuring International Financial
Support to Support Domestic Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries’,
Climate Strategies 2009, 5, available at www.climatestrategies.org (accessed 1 March
2011).
38 See ibid., 14–22; UNEP, Catalysing Low-Carbon Growth in Developing Economies:
Public Finance Mechanisms to Scale Up Private Sector Investment in Climate Solutions.
Case Study Analysis (2009), available at www.unepﬁ.org (accessed 15 February 2012).
39 Standard & Poor’s/Parhelion, Can Capital Markets Bridge the Climate Change Financing
Gap?, Report 2010, 2, available at www.parhelion.co.uk (accessed 16 February 2012).
40 Ibid., 4. 41 Ibid., 3.
42 For an overview of the insurance market, see European Commission, Financial Security
in Environmental Liability Directive, Final Report (August 2008), available at http://ec.
europa.eu (accessed 20 February 2012).
insurance risk transfer in developing countries 241
wake of growing environmental damage awards through the courts, the
insurance industry started to move to the development of speciﬁc
environmental-liability risk cover. As far as compensation is concerned,
environmental-liability insurance cover offers ex ante protection rather
than relying on ex post penalties and ﬁnes, which can be uncertain if a
polluter faces insolvency after an event. Compliance with current envir-
onmental laws and regulations is a standard condition for this type of
insurance. But expecting insurers to play a quasi regulatory role in
environmental protection through their risk selection process may be
overstretching the capacity of private insurers. The provision of cover can
provide an additional incentive for a company taking out insurance to
comply with regulatory requirements and improve its own environmen-
tal standards. But monitoring compliance requires additional tools and
expertise and the private sector usually relies on public regulators to take
this role rather than doing it themselves. Some commentators identify
insurance as a ‘surrogate regulatory tool’, arguing that through their own
risk assessment and the underwriting decisions insurers can drive the
behaviour of the insured.43 There is some empirical evidence suggesting
that insurers may effectively exercise a quasi-regulatory capacity for
potentially hazardous or polluting operations.44 According to this litera-
ture, the main driver for deterrence is the risk of not gaining insurance
cover if certain standards are not met. In general terms, insurance can
trigger risk-reduction activities if it is beneﬁcial for both the insured and
the insurer. In the context of environmental-liability insurance, the link
between risk reduction and provision of cover is evident: the adherence
to high standards, such as a company’s environmental management
system, can be a condition for the provision of insurance, or it may
justify a lower premium compared to those risks where lower (or no)
pollution standards are implemented. For insurers this is a direct way to
reduce and control insured losses during the lifespan of an insurance
policy (usually a year).
To what extent is the provision of compensation to victims and
reducing pollution by incentivising risk reduction relevant for climate
change activities in developing countries? The consideration of
43 OECD, Environmental Risks and Insurance, 53.
44 See Yin, Pfaff and Kunreuther, ‘Can Environmental Insurance Succeed’; B. J. Richardson,
‘Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental Regulation: Some Comparative and
Theoretical Perspectives’ (2002) 8 North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation 247.
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greenhouse gas emissions as pollution and the consequential award of
damages from losses linked to the emissions is subject to legal discus-
sions. Especially in the USA, several cases are currently being tested in
the courts to see if a carbon liability exists.45 The key difﬁculty is the
establishment of a causal link between emitting activities and damages.
This is referred to in climate change circles under the heading ‘attribu-
tion’: is it possible to determine how much of severe weather losses can
actually be linked to climate change? If the courts were to conclude that
carbon liability exists then one could envisage that liability insurers
would incentivise policyholders to reduce their emissions activities and/
or to incentivise adaptation activities. Yet, in practice, in such a scenario
it is likely that most insurers would apply a cover exclusion for carbon
liability.
9.2.3 Project insurance
9.2.3.1 Common project risks
There is evidence that risk transfer can facilitate climate investment and
support the development of ‘clean’ technologies by removing some of the
‘project risks’ faced by investors. Common project risks such as construc-
tion risks, property damage, political risk and liability can usually be
covered by traditional insurance in the same way as other large-scale
international investment projects. A wide range of private insurers offer
risk transfer of these mainly operational risks from project phase to
completion. Challenges, such as lack of loss data for new technologies
or unclear legal frameworks for liability, exist, but they can be overcome.
This point can be illustrated by reference to three examples, as follows.
In April 2012, Aviva, a major UK insurance company, unveiled a range
of new policies and services that cover operational risks for onshore
wind, solar, waste-to-energy, biomass power, environmental consultancy
and building technology ﬁrms. The ﬁrm offers public liability cover
worth up to £1m and will also cover the failure to supply power to the
electricity grid from a renewable energy project.
45 For example, on 17 January 2012, the Supreme Court of Virginia set aside its ground-
breaking judgment in AES Corporation v. Steadfast Insurance Company, 282 Va. 252
(2011), which held that the emission of carbon dioxide was not an ‘occurrence’ within
the meaning of a general liability policy. See ‘Virginia Court Grants Rehearing of
Global Warming Claims Case’, Insurance Journal (3 February 2012), available at www.
insurancejournal.com (accessed 18 March 2011).
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AIG provided one of the ﬁrst ever insurance coverage for a carbon
credit transaction back in 2007. The ﬁrm provided a letter of assurance to
Chinese factories covering the commitment from a Japanese ﬁrm to
honour the purchase of carbon credits generated under the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) recently pro-
vided one of the ﬁrst political insurance contracts for a reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) project. OPIC
provided US$900,000 in political insurance to Terra Global Capital, an
investor in the project. The speciﬁc REDD scheme aims to protect 64,318
hectares of forest in Cambodia and sequester approximately 8.7 million
metric tons of CO2.
Creating adaptation infrastructure and wider adaptive capacity in
developing countries also requires signiﬁcant funds and expertise. The
private sector will have to play a role in providing these funds in the same
way as in the mitigation projects outlined above. The adaptation invest-
ment projects, such as ﬂood protection infrastructure or drought man-
agement solutions, require similar risk transfer during the project phase.
This area has received scant attention and will require further elabor-
ation, speciﬁcally in discussions on how to secure private-sector adapta-
tion funding and where to spend the capital required for adaptation.46
9.2.3.2 Carbon-ﬁnance-speciﬁc risks
In addition to the above risks, low-carbon investments also face carbon-
ﬁnance-speciﬁc risks. Since the establishment of international carbon-
ﬁnance markets as part of the Kyoto Protocol,47 insurance has been
available to assist investors and transfer some of the risks, mainly in
the context of the joint implementation (JI) and the clean development
mechanisms (CDM), by combining traditional project insurance with
cover for emissions credits, such as credit delivery guarantees. The cover
is against lack of or under-performance of climate investment in terms of
the underlying emissions reduction. An example would be an industrial
facility funded through a CDM investment, which then fails to deliver the
expected emissions reduction.
46 For more information, see A. Persson et al., ‘Adaptation Finance Under a Copenhagen
Agreed Outcome’ (2009), Research Report, SEI, Stockholm, available at www.sei-
international.org (accessed 14 March 2012).
47 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Kyoto, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148.
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These risk-transfer solutions are offered by the private insurance
market, but often in close cooperation with international organisations.
They are in direct response to the speciﬁc needs of climate investments.
An example is Swiss Re’s cover for CDM projects, developed in 2006,48 or
Munich Re’s ‘Kyoto Multi Risk Policy’, developed for international
carbon markets.49 The growth in carbon markets has also led to the
establishment of specialty insurance service providers such as Carbon Re
and Parhelion, who offer assistance with risk solutions in carbon ﬁnance.
Carbon Re, supported by the global environment facility (GEF) and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has developed an
insurance product for renewable energy projects in developing countries.
Besides the traditional insurance products for construction, operation
and transit for renewable energy projects, the service offers bespoke
covers such as carbon-counterparty credit risk insurance, carbon all-
risk insurance and carbon delivery guarantee insurance/Kyoto multi-
risk policy. But despite these developments it is difﬁcult to assess the
size of the transactions and the volume of supply and demand for these
speciﬁc products, particularly with regards to projects based in develop-
ing countries.
9.2.3.3 Political risk
Investments in foreign countries face political risks. In the insurance
industry, the term ‘political risk’ covers areas such as currency convert-
ibility and transfer, expropriation, political violence, breach of contract
by a host government and the non-honouring of sovereign ﬁnancial
obligations.50 In the wake of globalisation and the growth of international
trade, governments in the developed world have concluded that one way
48 A brief characterisation of this instrument appears on the website of Swiss Re: ‘The
insurance product, which was developed by Swiss Re and RNK, covers Kyoto-related risk
to carbon credit purchases by RNK. The policy, issued by Swiss Re subsidiary European
International Reinsurance Ltd, provides coverage for the risks related to Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) project registration and the issuance of certiﬁed emissions
reduction credits (CERs) under the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM. These risks include the failure
or delay in the approval, certiﬁcation and/or issuance of CERs from CDM projects by
United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’, RNK Capital
and Swiss Re Structure First Insurance Product for CDM Carbon Credit Transactions,
available at www.swissre.com (accessed 11 March 2012).
49 Munich Re, Topics Geo: Natural Catastrophes 2006: Analyses, Assessments, Positions,
2007, available at http://extremeweatherheroes.org (accessed 14 March 2012).
50 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), World Investment and Political Risk,
2009, 28.
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of encouraging further trade and investment by companies is the provi-
sion of political risk insurance, believing that this would provide positive
externalities for the wider economy. Political risk cover is now available
through (inter-)governmental agencies, for example, the World Bank
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and also some
private insurers, such as Lloyd’s of London, Atradius or Hiscox. The
products offered by these public and private institutions can also be
applied to climate-related investments in developing countries, as
the political risks facing these investments are not different from those
experienced in other sectors and in international trade.
An illustration of the importance of political risk for low-carbon
investments is provided by the Desertec Industrial Initiative, launched
in 2009 by a large group of leading companies from different sectors,
including Munich Re. The project seeks to foster investment in
the utilisation of renewable energy in North Africa. In light of
current political changes in the North Africa and Middle East region
the political risk of this project has received increased attention.
Political risk insurance is a specialist area and some limitations on
the type of risk and locations apply. Signiﬁcantly, political risk insur-
ance not always covers (or covers inadequately) regulatory risks,
although these latter are increasingly viewed by investors as a major
source of risk.51
But one can expect that extensions of existing political risk-transfer
products will seek to provide coverage to climate-related projects. Such
extensions could be operated either publicly – through government or
governmental agencies – or privately. Similarly, they could be pursued
either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis. This could provide
support to investors and reduce some of the investment risks in the
transition to a low-carbon economy. Mills52 outlines a range of insur-
ance products pertaining to political and regulatory stability risk that
could be relevant in this connection: companies providing political
risk insurance include ACE and Zurich for carbon-emissions trading
and carbon-credit projects. Munich Re includes political risk in its
Kyoto policy and Carbon Re additionally offers political risk products
as well as products covering other risks associated with carbon-
reduction projects.
51 MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk, 2011, 46.
52 See Mills, From Risk to Opportunity, 40.
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9.2.4 Natural disaster cover
Developing countries are at risk from changes in extreme events, owing
to a combination of factors such as geography (with many being located
in already hot tropical and sub-tropical regions), sensitivity of the econ-
omies to weather (because of the relative dominance of agriculture) and
lack of resources to prepare for disasters or increase resilience levels.53
The application of risk transfer to manage the impacts of natural disas-
ters is relatively well researched, but unevenly applied across the world,
with the extent and scope of risk transfer varying from country to
country.54 Over the last decade, more risk-transfer schemes have been
developed in poor countries, often run as pilot projects between the
private sector and public authorities. The recently published
Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing
World55 offers a snapshot of current risk-transfer activities in low- and
middle-income countries.
The Compendium documents 123 existing initiatives in middle-
income and lower-income countries that involve the transfer of ﬁnancial
risk associated with the occurrence of natural hazards. There appears to
be potential in many places and a growing recognition of the possible
roles for risk transfer in fostering risk-reduction activities. Closer exam-
ination shows that the schemes are truly diverse, often created to meet
very speciﬁc needs in a particular community, with a wide range of
stakeholders being involved, and differing levels of risk transfer being
provided. The cover is provided via private insurers, governments or
public–private partnerships. While agricultural insurance is the most
common form in all countries, a particular geographical preference for
other types of insurance is noticeable, such as micro-insurance against
natural disasters in Asia. This may reﬂect local tradition and possibly also
cultural differences, while other factors, such as links to micro-ﬁnance
schemes, may also have an inﬂuence.56
53 A. Millner and S. Dietz, ‘Adaptation to Climate Change and Economic Growth in
Developing Countries’, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Envir-
onment Working Paper 60 (2011), 2, available at www2.lse.ac.uk (accessed 24 February
2012).
54 CEA, European Insurance – Key Facts, 4.
55 ClimateWise, Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World,
available at www.climatewise.org.uk (accessed 20 February 2012).
56 S. Surminski and D. Oramas-Dorta, ‘Building Effective and Sustainable Risk Transfer
Initiatives in Low- and Middle-Income Economies: What Can We Learn from Existing
Insurance Schemes?’, Policy paper, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy/
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The main aim of these schemes is compensation after a loss. But
depending on design and operation of the risk transfer this can also lead
to risk reduction and greater resilience. As experience with ﬂood and
windstorm insurance in developed countries shows, there are some key
principles that should be met when designing and regulating insurance
schemes to make full use of their risk-reduction role: (i) risk levels should
drive the pricing of insurance cover (risk-based pricing rather than
cross-subsidisation); (ii) granting of cover must require certain measures
of risk reduction to be in place (such as business continuity plans or
strengthened roofs in exposed coastal areas); (iii) insurance payouts after
a loss must increase resilience (for example, through resilient repair after
a ﬂood). Surminski and Oramas-Dorta show that the full potential for
utilising risk transfer for adaptation is far from exhausted.57 Only very
few schemes have a direct operational link between risk transfer and risk
reduction. Not surprisingly, the large majority of risk-transfer schemes
focus on today’s weather risks and do not capture climate change in
vulnerable low-income countries. The Cancún Adaptation Framework,
an outcome of the 16th Session of the Conference of Parties to the
UNFCCC, highlights the need to strengthen international cooperation
and expertise to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with
the adverse effects of climate change. In this context, a new work
programme on ‘Loss and Damage’ has been initiated in order to assess
the potential of a wide range of adaptation and risk-management meas-
ures. One particular focus of this work stream is the proposal to create
a climate insurance facility to provide cover against extreme weather
events.58
9.2.5 Policy risks
Another challenge for investors in climate projects is the risk that
underlying policy frameworks and subsidy schemes may change during
the lifetime of their investment. Changing political landscapes can make
an investment unproﬁtable, which is often highlighted by investors as a
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (2011), 23,
available at www.cccep.ac.uk (accessed 27 February 2012).
57 Ibid., 24.
58 See http://unfccc.int/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/loss_and_damage/items/
6056.php (accessed 14 March 2012).
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key barrier for climate investment ﬂows into developing countries.59 This
policy risk is relevant not just in a developing country context, but also in
established markets, where changes to climate policy may affect the
validity of investments.
If we look ﬁrst at mitigation efforts, low-carbon sectors such as
renewable energy have been and continue to be hugely dependent on
public policy, not just in terms of the usual subsidies and technology
push measures, but also in terms of political decisions on emissions
reduction and the structure of international carbon ﬁnance. This
creates a degree of political dependence and uncertainty in terms of
sudden policy changes, which may make investments unproﬁtable.
This is often quoted as one of the key barriers to climate-related
investment. The potential for transferring these risks has not been
investigated in great detail, but an initial assessment by stakeholders
such as the Climate Bonds initiative suggests that these type of risks
might only be insurable through public schemes. Yet, there appears to
be a possibility for some private insurance cover related to some
retrospective changes to law and regulation, as illustrated by a recent
insurance transaction developed by Lloyds Syndicate Kiln and special-
ists ﬁrm Parhelion. This collaborative offering provides an insurance
product designed to compensate policyholders against changes in
legislation in the European Union that could impact suddenly on the
value of carbon credits or certiﬁed emissions reduction (CER) credits.
The product is designed to create more certainty and stability for
ﬁnancial institutions trading carbon credits in Europe.
This is a very new area for insurers and it is too early to say if there will
be a broader private market for these types of products or whether this will
be a task for public institutions, possibly as an extension of the existing
political risk schemes. This issue is also very relevant in the developed
world context, where some recent policy changes have had signiﬁcant
implications for investors. Judicial proceedings triggered by these changes,
which might possibly lead to compensation payments by governments, are
still ongoing with an unclear outcome, as evidenced in the UK’s legal
dispute about the government’s revision of renewable feed-in tariffs.60
59 Standard & Poor’s/Parhelion, Can Capital Markets Bridge the Climate Change Financing
Gap?, Report 2010, 3.
60 See Department for Energy and Climate Change, Application to the Supreme Court,
21 February 2012, available at www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/ﬁts_supcourt/
ﬁts_supcourt.aspx (accessed 15 March 2012).
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With respect to adaptation, creating the necessary infrastructure and wider
adaptive capacity in developing countries requires signiﬁcant funds and
also expertise. These adaptation investments, such as ﬂood protection
infrastructure or draught management solutions, face also policy risks.
Yet, this area has been explored even less than mitigation investments,
although it is likely to gain more prominence in the context of discussions
about adaptation ﬁnance. When it comes to policy risks, in particular, the
application of traditional risk transfer may prove difﬁcult or impossible for
private insurers owing to the nature of the risk and the high legal and
political uncertainty attached to it. Thus, any solutions may have to involve
the state. State involvement would be justiﬁed by a market failure (if no
private cover can be offered) and/or by the overall political and economic
rationale for supporting climate investments in developing countries.
While there are signiﬁcant limits to insurability, a pragmatic view
would suggest that market demand will eventually trigger supply. Strong
regulatory systems and institutions will be key enabling factors for this
type of policy.61 But further research and market assessments are still
needed to investigate the potential for this risk transfer.
CONCLUSION
Insurance risk transfer has for centuries been part of economic activity
and provided ﬁnancial resilience for individuals, companies and govern-
ments in the face of uncertain losses. This article has explored if and how
this mechanism can be applied to harness investment in environmental
protection in developing countries by investigating the case of climate
change. Any investment faces risks. Underwriting some of these in
exchange for a premium payment can reduce investors’ uncertainty
and make some investments more attractive.
The above analysis identiﬁed three potential roles for insurance risk
transfer in the context of environmental protection: compensation for
victims and funding of clean-up processes; incentivising risk-reduction
efforts; and fostering environmental investments by transferring some of
the investment risks. The compensation element is still of limited rele-
vance in the climate change context, because the legal interpretation of
liability for damages arising from greenhouse gas emissions is not clear
61 J. Brown and M. Jacobs, ‘Leveraging Private Investment: The Role of Public Sector
Climate Finance’, ODI Background Notes (April 2011), 3, available at www.odi.org.uk
(accessed 5 March 2012).
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yet. As seen in pilot projects in a range of developing countries, there is
scope for insurance schemes to incentivise risk reduction and adaptation
as well as regulatory compliance. But the effectiveness of this process
depends on the design of the insurance products, an area which is
currently investigated both by the insurance industry and by policy-
makers. In the context of climate change investments there is evidence
that the transfer of investment risks could provide a boost for private
climate funding. While insurance solutions already exist for most of the
common project risks and political risks attached to mitigation and
adaptation investments, there are a range of speciﬁc risks for which no
cover has been developed and where only public insurance schemes or
public–private partnerships may be able to offer risk transfer. The
existing political commitment to increased investment in climate change
action could justify public support for risk-transfer solutions that reduce
the investment risks as a way to reduce the barriers to private investment
in climate action.
In addition to these three roles, there may be other reasons for insurers
to promote mitigation through their products: they may see it as good
citizenship under their wider corporate sustainability agenda; they may
use climate-mitigation activities to create a positive image amongst
stakeholders; or they may use certain green policies to target ‘responsible’
customers who are perceived to be less likely to experience losses than
less environmentally conscious individuals or companies. Some insurers
have developed speciﬁc policies, which seem to reward environmentally
friendly behaviour. Some motor insurance policies charge less premium
if a car is driven less, on the basis that this also reﬂects on the risk of
accidents. The fact that this will also reduce the car emissions is a side
effect, but not the main driving force for the insurer.
The application of insurance risk transfer in the context of climate-
change investments is a relatively new area and an overall assessment of
the effectiveness and efﬁciency of the solutions offered has not been
conducted yet. There is growing knowledge about barriers and con-
straints and both industry and decision makers are exploring ways to
improve and enhance the environmental role of risk transfer. This
provides an opportunity for developing countries to avoid repeating past
mistakes in the developed world and for the industry to become more
innovative in linking the environmental role to other insurance func-
tions. This could lead to sustainable insurance solutions that support
environmental protection, but it will not replace the need for environ-
mental regulation.
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